The paper analyses the development towards Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) in the forestry sector in Tanzania, Mozambique and Vietnam. The main research question is: does the sector-wide approach promote effective delivery of aid? There are two critical factors in effective implementation of SWAps in the forestry sector: (a) efficiency in financial flow and management, and (b) national ownership in the forestry sector development. The paper argues that SWAps in forestry might be less successful than in other sectors because of the dominance of market forces in the forestry sector, and might not be the most effective way to deliver aid because of the dependence on the quality of institutional capacity in the recipient countries and donor countries. SWAps and direct budget support (DBS) may take several years to begin producing concrete results in rural development and poverty reduction. The paper concludes that a range of support modalities are needed, and SWAps and DBS are important in developing national ownership. However, in all likelihood, projects in the forestry sector will remain important instruments for implementing sector strategies and national development frameworks.
INTRODUCTION
Sector-Wide Approach programmes (SWAps) and Direct Budget Support (DBS, targeted or general) are considered to be two aid modalities that might achieve more coordinated and effective support for national development frameworks than earlier modalities aid (European Commission 2003 , OECD 2006 . While SWAps gather donors and the partner government together to plan and manage sector funding, DBS supports directly the recipient government's budget and plans. According to Gould et al. (1998) , ideally, SWAps include the following features: (a) a programme-aid approach, meaning that funding is not organised via bilateral projects run by individual donors, but is collective funding of an overall programme, implemented by the partner government in the form of programme components, (b) an attempt, through a dialogue based on 'partnership', to harmonise the policies and procedures of aid provision, (c) a longterm 'evolutionary' process with protracted negotiation and continual monitoring by stakeholders, and (d) the recipient is in the proverbial 'driver's seat'. It is important to recognise that SWAps are not simply mechanisms for allocating donor funds, but rather approaches for strengthening overall sectoral management, irrespective of whether or not Official Development Assistance (ODA) is provided.
Development co-operation in forestry used to be based on project support. Well-known common problems of the project approach are a lack of host country ownership and 'fungibility', where donor money is either used for purposes other than those intended, or it replaces government funding in that sector, rather than adding to it (Persson 2003, White and Mustalahti 2005) . Working through separate projects can lead to a situation where the complexity of the whole sector is not appreciated by the national government or donors, and where parts of the sector development activities overlap, whereas others are neglected. The multitude of projects can also overload the administration of the host government and fail to produce sustainable results despite relatively high upfront costs. Many projects have been successful, however, in delivering local benefits and responding to local needs: they generate information for the higher level of government as to what is happening in the field and where the needs are, and they provide hands-on training opportunities for locals, transparency and relatively clear financial flows (White and Mustalahti 2005) .
It is commonly agreed that actions aiming to improve the living conditions in the rural communities contribute significantly to achieving the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Sustainable forest management in developing countries contributes to poverty reduction (FAO 2001 , CIFOR 2005 . However, in the forestry sector, the weaknesses of the sectoral frameworks and lack of political and economic support from the national governments hinder the long-term forestry sector development in developing countries (Anderson et al. 2006 , Mayers and Bass 2004 , Persson 2003 , SBS-Brief Seven 2006 , Sunderlin 2006 . Governments, within their new development guidelines such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and MDGs, are preoccupied with other sectors. In many developing countries, the forestry sector is not high on the political agenda (Dickson and Bird 2004) . For example, before the PRSPs existed, most Sub-Saharan African countries implemented Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and reduced expenditures through cutting support to forestry training (Kowero et al. 2006) . To date, SWAps in health, primary and secondary education and roads have been the most successful, as these are accepted as priorities for development (health and education figuring prominently among the MDGs) and there are few stakeholder groups (Brown et al. 1999) .
Since the mid-1980s, various international frameworks such as Forestry Master Plans, Forestry Sector Reviews and the Tropical Forestry Action Plans have been developed to guide forestry sector development (Wencelius 2003) . The current concept for National Forest Programmes (NFP) builds on the lessons from the earlier frameworks. Development of an NFP can be seen as a way forward towards clearer sector policy and better management structures, and the NFP process seeks the commitment of government, donors and partners to support the forestry sector and willingness to harmonise the support (Geller and Owino 2002) . NFP can provide an umbrella for a wide selection of integrated forest planning and management activities -perhaps not necessarily as coordinated as a full SWAp, but having the advantage of starting small, i.e. without high requirements for coordination, and allowing the incorporation of many financing mechanisms and components (Brown et al. 1999 , Simula 2006 . This paper analyses the effectiveness of the allocation of donor support within the partner countries' development frameworks in the forestry sectors in Tanzania, Mozambique and Vietnam. The main research question is: does the sectorwide approach promote effective delivery of aid? This paper seeks to contribute to the international discussion on possibilities and barriers of SWAps and DBS as aid modalities. The Paris Declaration, endorsed in 2005, passed an international agreement on aid effectiveness to which donor and recipient countries and organisations committed to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitored actions and indicators. In theory, the harmonised partnerships between the government and development agencies aim to improve the effectiveness of development policies and broaden government ownership over public sector policy rural y reducción de la pobreza. El estudio concluye que hacen falta también otras modalidades de apoyo, pero que los SWAps y el apoyo directo presupuestal pueden desempeñar un papel fundamental en el desarrollo de la propiedad estatal en el sector. Sin embargo, resulta probable que los proyectos en el sector forestal seguirán siendo instrumentos importantes para la implementación de estrategias en el sector y marcos para el desarrollo a nivel nacional.
and allocation of resources in order to reach the MDGs. The Paris Declaration has twelve indicators related to this theory of effectiveness of aid. For purpose of this paper, two crucial factor of effectiveness of SWAps in the forestry were selected based on the indicators in the Paris Declaration: (a) efficiency in financial flow and management, and (b) national ownership in the forestry sector development.
The methodology of the paper is influenced by participant observations, an ethnographical method: while conducting research aim was to spend time with informants and observe day-to-day activities in order to obtain context-specific information. This was possible because authors have worked as consultants and researchers in the countries in question. The paper includes information from discussions with international consultants and donor authorities and from interviews with local and central government officers and communities in the recipient countries. Additionally, this study is based on a literature review and analysis of policy documentation, laws, project documents and consultancy reports (Mustalahti et al. 2006) .
The country case studies are presented next. After that, the discussion section of the paper presents the analysis of the effectiveness of the sector-wide approach in forestry based on the case studies and the two crucial factors of effectiveness.
In conclusion, we try to answer to the main research question of this paper and give some recommendations for donor organisations.
CASE STUDIES

Tanzania:
Moving toward co-ordinated sector development in forestry
In the late 1980s, in order to address the problem of deforestation and opportunities for forest-based sustainable development, the Government of Tanzania started long-term sectoral planning to prepare the Tanzanian Forest Action Plan. Subsequently, the NFP and its action plan were prepared within an overall national macroeconomic framework and that of the other sector policies (Government of Finland and Government of Tanzania 1999) .
According to interviewees from the Forestry and Beekeeping Division, at the time of the formulation of the NFP in 1999, over 30 forestry-related projects were ongoing. Most of the partners worked through the Forestry and Beekeeping Division. Some had direct links to local authorities. International NGOs mainly worked with corresponding local NGOs. Many projects caused difficulties in co-ordination of the forestry sector. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (2001a) defines the need for aid harmonisation: it aims to develop a sector-wide approach based on enhanced national capacity and rationalisation of resource use, reducing the donor dependence of the sector from 68% to 20%, and notes that in the past, the design and implementation of forestry sector programmes have been fragmented, ineffectively coordinated and largely donordriven. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (2001a) recognised the need for the NFP in order to increase the sector's priority and the political commitment to forestry.
Concurrently with NFP formulation, a large World Bank loan project supports forestry sector reform, and aims to establish the Tanzania Forest Service (TFS) and strengthen participatory forest management (PFM). Via the PFM component the FBD aimed to unify the programme model. The funding is currently channelled to local governments in the 50 selected districts out of Tanzania's 114 districts and as well as increasingly supporting the NGOs and the private sector (Blomley and Ramadhani 2006) . However, Simula (2005) notes several critical issues at local level, including the need for a transparent revenue collection system, clear land ownership or user rights, information on markets, and encouragement for both villagers and the private sector. In addition, the National Forestry and Beekeeping Programme Joint Annual Review Report (2006) reported that there is a need to make the anti-corruption plan of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism more performance oriented, and to formulate and implement a National Action Plan to combat illegal logging. Milledge et al. (2007) report that Tanzania collects only 10% of the revenue from their timber exports, and the trade statistics show that China imports ten times more products from Tanzania than appear on Tanzania's own export records.
In Tanzania, SWAps for health and education budgets are implemented according to a mid-term expenditure framework (MTEF), and budgetary monitoring has the form of a public expenditure review (PER). The Government has adopted Vision 2025 (a long-term development programme), the Tanzanian Assistance Strategy (TAS -a social and economic strategy agreed by the Government and donor agencies), a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). The latter will form the core framework for assistance to Tanzania. Introducing these macro programmes led to formulating a strategic sector-wide approach, allocation of strategic budgets to each sector, and monitoring of budgets. The NSGRP does not separately identify priority sectors for support and development. This facilitates integrating the forestry sector within the national development framework. However, the integration will depend on the advocacy skills of forestry authorities involved.
The forestry sector in Tanzania made some progress towards developing a unified programme that aims to treat all major expenditures in a unified way: in 2001, a baseline study on the feasibility of a sector-wide approach in forestry was presented (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 2001b). In 2004, a joint Government and development partners' meeting on the SWAp in forestry and beekeeping generated commitment and partnership for the SWAp process. However, the development partners are still not fully committed in practice to the SWAp and institutional changes to implement SWAp are yet to yield results. For example, donors are still earmarking their funding for the activities according to their priorities and the alignment of SWAp with budgeting process is weak due to the continuing dominance 
Mozambique: Forestry Sector Development and its challenges
Mozambique has many sectoral and multi-sectoral policies and action plans designed to meet the overall objectives of poverty reduction. An action plan for the Absolute Poverty Reduction Strategy (PARPA I and current PARPA II) set up the framework for the operational matrix of the agriculture investment programme called PROAGRI and the National Plan of Agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 1997). Under PROAGRI a common pool arrangement was established for internal and external funding in the sector. This was expected to reduce the transaction costs of multiple accounting systems. The common procedures for donors were intended to eliminate parallel structures of projects and to commit donors to harmonising their accounting, procurements and auditing (Cuco et al. 2003) .
PROAGRI started in 1999 after a long formulation process and the first phase, funded by over 16 donors, had a budget of over US$ 200 million to finance activities within eight components (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2003) . One of the components of PROAGRI, forestry and wildlife, can be considered as an NFP, as it addressed the opportunities and constraints for conservation and sustainable use of forestry and wildlife, and it could be also recognised as a frame for harmonised sectoral support in forestry.
Some components of PROAGRI have received no funding since 2004, and as an example of the problems experienced, according to interviewees at provincial level, funds allocated for annual work plans in PROAGRI, as well as the education sector SWAp, have only reached the local level more than nine months or even a year late. In 2003, the evaluation of PROAGRI in Mozambique recognised that there are many limiting factors in the shift from project support to a common pool arrangement, but in particular, management of allocated financial resources formed a bottleneck (Ministério da Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural 2003). Another reason seems to be that the National Plan for Agriculture is preoccupied by food security issues and agriculture development, and forestry is a low national priority. For example, at the request of the Government of Mozambique, FAO prepared in 2005 a proposal to contribute to the implementation of the Participatory Forest and Wildlife Law Enforcement Strategy and its Action Plan (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , through the Forests and Wildlife Component of PROAGRI. However, there were no funds to implement this component and others, for example, the scaling-up of community forestry practices.
The main challenge for PROAGRI is to implement the policies and action plans in the remote areas, to ensure fund flows to the rural development activities at different governance levels and geographical areas, and to ensure that resources are distributed to benefit the poor and support sound development. This is not easy in the countryside, where the government reform programme is at an early stage, and administration structures and human capacity under the local governments are undeveloped. The development of the PROAGRI model has been slow and the first phase of PROAGRI had serious problems with fungibility and poor financial management of allocated resources. In 2001 the audit undertaken within the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry detected problems and recommended organisational measures, including training staff at provincial level in financial management. PROAGRI finances were criticised in interviews with donor representatives, as external auditors found serious deficiencies in the accounts of 2000.
Currently, the insufficient government funding for forestry is supplemented by donor projects, such as a loan project from the Nordic Development Fund, long-term grant funding from FAO and several smaller bilateral projects. Although there is ongoing local government reform and a new forest policy, and the staff and funding are increasing in sub-national level, human and financial capacity remain insufficient to support the implementation of new policy objectives at district and community level, in spite of donor projects and NGO interventions. Based on observations in Mozambique, the meagre government salaries are insufficient to support a family. For survival, civil servants often need to either work two jobs and participate in all possible workshops and overnight travels, or to work for donor projects and NGOs in order to get allowances, or be corrupt. Several forestry staff members at the Ministry and provincial level are engaged in consulting assignments with numerous donor project activities -as well as the private companies in the forestry sector -and may not be totally objective regarding the implementation of policy and structural changes -for instance in the case of regulations in forest law enforcement and export of timber resources.
Forestry assistance, via support of individual grant or loan projects, has not had a significant influence on the problems of the sector, such as extensive deforestation, illegal logging, and the increasing poverty of people dependent on forests (Pijnenburg 1999 , Nhantumbo et al. 2003 , MacKenzie 2005 , Mustalahti 2006 . Based on interviews and observations in Mozambique, it seems that fragmented donor support diverts attention from important issues: (a) public sector reform in forestry to improve government salaries, (b) efforts to ensure transparency and better working moral among civil servants, and (c) moves to introduce a strategy for law enforcement and related legislation in the sector.
Mozambique still has abundant forest resources despite forest fires and illegal logging. Timber is an important export article -its extraction takes a heavy toll from the natural forests, and forests keep disappearing (MacKenzie 2005) . In Mozambique, the stakeholders are beginning to understand that the key factors influencing the management of forests remain outside the sector (Cuco et al. 2003) . International trade issues, industrial policies, law enforcement strategies, decentralisation of government administration, and land legislation may have more influence on the state of the nation's forests than specific forest policy and legislation. According to the private entrepreneurs interviewed in Mozambique, it is important to generate domestic and private sector financing, which could improve investment through access to bank credits and micro-credit programmes. The private sector and forest enterprises, as well as community forestry groups, do not have special interest groups or organisations to protect their interests and to ensure, for example, their access to resource and markets. The 5MHRP was a national investment programme that provides financing for a defined set of activities. Since the 5MHRP was supported by many donor agencies, integration for example to the government monitoring and evaluation structures is crucial but difficult. There are examples where the government-driven review and evaluation reports are not available for donors. An example of this: the government carried out a mid-term evaluation of the implementation of the 5MHRP for 1998-2010. However, this critical document is not translated into English -only some parts of it are available for the donors. In 2006, the partners organised a joint review but this review mainly concentrated on organisational issues related to the donor coordination and implementation of the sector support funding approach, and still, there is limited information available about the practices and impacts of 5MHRP at district and village level. The implementation of the 5MHRP has been limited to activities focused on forest protection and reforestation, through tree planting and protection of forests in critical areas. Based on the interviews and observations in Bac Kan province, and discussions with NGO and FSSP staff nationally, it seems that 5MHRP is making reasonable (though not very coordinated yet) progress in protection forestry. Production forestry is less successful as there is insufficient private sector involvement.
The FSSP&P aims for coherent support and a shift towards programmatic and co-ordinated assistance in the sector. In 2004, the Government and donor organisations published a report on harmonisation of investment procedures and project implementation frameworks for major reforestation projects, looking at how the Government procedures and those of major donors, such as the ADB, World Bank, JBGIC, KFW, and EU, could be harmonised. This was an important step towards a SWAp type harmonised sector financing modality (or at the very least, minimised problems from the differing financing rules of different donors). In support of harmonisation, a multi-donor Trust Fund for Forests (TFF) was established in 2004, with bilateral contributions from Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, and technical assistance from GTZ. This fund was intended to provide strategic support to the sector, including poverty reduction, and to pilot windows for sector budget support. To date, the TFF has concentrated on supporting grants for projects relating to sector priorities.
It seems that the TFF is not fully supported by all the donors: In 2006, a joint donor review recognised that despite the work of the donor co-ordination office, a parallel planning framework for donors still exists and there has been limited progress to develop donor support for government-led plans (Joint Review of the Trust Fund for Forests 2006) . The Joint Review team found that the focus of the FSSP&P has been on creating studies, guidelines and principles in support of defining sector policy and strategy, and on administering the TFF. Vietnamese ownership of the TFF is gradually increasing, though it remains to be seen if it can function as a tool of targeted budget support.
The Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness (2006) notes that the use of the Government procurement processes, financial management and safeguards still remains a major challenge for donors: the development of a SWAp was considerably more challenging than most donors had imagined at the beginning of the FSSP&P. Among donors there are concerns about transparency, fiduciary risk and corruption, and that Government of Vietnam systems do not meet donors' standards for accountability. Although, for example, Cox (2006) indicates that Government of Vietnam systems are functioning well, showing high project completion rates and low leakage rates, the interviewed donor and NGO representatives in forestry sector still reported problems with leakages: the project completion rates might be high, but is the quality adequate and do the projects actually support the agreed purposes? For example, the bottleneck seems to be extension and other services -often provided by a political organisation with limited technical skills -for poor people in remote areas with very little possibility to complain about the quality of the services. Analyses of literature and observations in Vietnam suggest that in other sectors the national ownership and capacity to support policy objectives and managing public expenditure is high, and because of that the SWAps as aid modality might be more successful compared to difficulties in implementing a SWAp in the forestry sector.
The Joint Review of the Trust Fund for Forests (2006) considers that sector budget support or a SWAp are not recommended nor possible for the forestry sector, as they would require a radical change in management and would be difficult to achieve, particularly given that ODA is likely to decrease in the medium term in Vietnam. Instead, donors will attempt to improve coordination and support joint activities in certain targeted areas and focus on supporting the new NFS, which has absorbed the nine result areas of the FSSP&P. Support for regional forestry networks has been positive and the FSSP&P will continue to bring together groups of provinces to share experiences and training.
In Vietnam, 2.4 million out of 80 million people -only three per cent of the population -are Communist Party members, who can influence decision-making through party cells. In such political circumstances, it is challenging for the NFS and SWAp in the forestry sector, to facilitate meaningful involvement of key stakeholders beyond government offices and party cells. Although 'the people know, the people discuss, the people do, the people supervise' is a guiding principle of the Grassroots Democracy Decree and widely quoted by officials and village leaders in Vietnam, more often in practice it is only 'the people do' -in terms of obligatory labour contributions to public works such as forest protection. This is partly traditional practice and reluctance to relinquish control, and partly a lack of local planning and budgeting skills, resources, and information needed for planning. For example, in the forestry sector, it seems that the Government has not developed mechanisms to allocate funds to provincial, district and village activities through unified planning, budgeting disbursement and accounting systems, but instead has continued with 'business as usual' and top-down planning. In 2007 an Ordinance on Implementation of Democracy at the Commune Level was promulgated, giving considerably strengthened power to the commune level representatives (via the Fatherland Front).
However, if the previous Grassroots Democracy Decree had only limited practical outcomes in decentralising control, it is still too early to tell about the impact of this ordinance. The Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support (2006, p.S3) notes that although many harmonisation and alignment initiatives have been implemented in Vietnam, 'progress has been slower than anticipated and has focused more on harmonising procedures and alignment with government policy, rather than aligning with government systems'.
DISCUSSION
Efficiency in financial flow and management
In the forestry sector, the success of NFPs and SWAps depends on: a) mobilisation of domestic revenue collection, (b) utilisation of limited development resources more effectively, and (c) reduction of administration demands and costs among the donor and recipient countries through new management structures. In theory, all major expenditures and activities in the sector should be programmed in a unified way, with resource allocation decisions based upon one policy and expenditure framework as recommended by the European Commission (2003) . In practice, the three cases show that it is difficult to implement in the forestry sector, and in the case of expenditure management, governmentdonor coordination and integration seems to be difficult and slow.
One problem is that financial information is scattered among different government institutions, donor projects, private companies and NGOs and there is no comprehensive picture on what funding exists, where it is located, and how recent, or up-to-date the sector funding information is. For example, during the field work of this study, it was easier to get information on donor funds than on domestic fund flows, including private sector funding in the forestry sector. In order to permit unified planning, information of potential private sector funding through, for example, revenue collection and investments in the sector, is necessary. In addition, government-and externally-funded programmes should ideally be based upon the same budgetary calendar. The main problem resulting from insufficient information flows in all three countries is the substantial revenue lost at national and sub-national level due to under-collection and reporting of revenues in the forestry sector (McElwee 2004 , Mackenzie 2005 , Milledge et al. 2007 .
The institutional and financial structures of external funding organisations and donor countries make unified budgeting and the budgetary calendar difficult to implement. Some donors (for instance, the UK and Canada) provide multi-year commitments of funding, which allow stability and help longer term budgeting, while others (for instance, the EU and USA) commit cautiously on an annual basis only (OECD 2004) . Each donor country proceeds with its development assistance in accordance with its own development policy in a framework where assistance modalities are flexibly adopted.
In addition, the effectiveness of harmonised aid management under SWAps and DBS is seen very differently by different donors: the German government has been sceptical regarding the effectiveness of SWAps and DBS, and still finances bilateral projects in several sectors. German development practitioners and administrators interviewed argued against the 'kill the project-attitude' and are worried that SWAps and DBS have more leakage of funds than project-based aid modalities. In contrast, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland is moving to allocate much of their bilateral aid through SWAps and DBS in key countries. In Finland, the argument has been that projectbased support generates administration tasks and costs for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as local governments, and this encourages the Ministry to hasten entering into SWAps and DBS agreements. High level staff in the Ministry expresses frustration at the sometimes slow disbursement in projects and SWAPs, whereas DBS is seen as a way to increase and facilitate development expenditure.
However, effective development assistance requires establishing management structures that provide donors with the assurance that development funds not only are disbursed, but also are used for the agreed purposes. Under current circumstances, transparent and effective management and monitoring structures are not in place in our three study countries and corruption is a risk. We recognise that fungibility and leakages are a problem in the case of SWAps, and fund flows are not always as smooth as anticipated. Government funds as well as those of donor agencies have a tendency to stay in the capital city and to be used for running costs such as meetings and infrastructure. Although this seems to be a common and well-known phenomenon in the case of SWAps and DBS, the interviewees from donor community reported that sub-national administration staff has been reluctant to complain to donor representatives in front of central ministry staff.
Another issue pointed out by interviewees, for example German, Finnish and Danish advisers, was that although there are high transaction costs in projects, in the form of international and national technical advisor costs, these costs are public. By contrast, the publicly seen transaction costs of SWAps and DBS are low, but the hidden costs in the form of corruption, or what is euphemistically referred to as leakage, may be very high. Many interviewees from local levels noted that an advantage of project modalities is that funds are available as needed for approved plans, or if not, it is easier to contact the bilateral donor and complain about the problems with the fund flows.
National ownership in forestry sector development
The cases show that before the allocation of funds through SWAps in forestry is possible, several issues in sector and donor polices need to be agreed and further developed. Donors can have a marked influence on the negotiation process in the preparation of new policies and programmes, but respect for national sovereignty is important. Optimists we interviewed argued that building a SWAp through a participative process can act as a tool for obtaining good results in enhanced ownership and responsibility for development processes. However, as Seppälä (2000) reports, some researchers argue that an emphasis on partnership, dialogue and ownership might be merely a slogan that conceals direct Western domination. If a recipient government lacks the means to ensure accountability of its institutions -as in the case of under-reported revenues in forestry sector -the ownership of the sector programme will not be secure. Monitoring and evaluation of fund flows in the sector is a crucial issue for building relationships between the recipient government, domestic stakeholders and donors -one which is based on accountability and trust, but without infringing the local partner's ownership.
There is also the risk that the SWAp lacks representation from the grassroots, especially from poor and rural communities, the very people whose support is critical to development initiatives and the implementation of development activities in forestry. Ownership of SWAp processes and planning in the central ministry does not automatically mean the best development for poor people. Ownership can be close to re-centralisation in forestry sector. The centralising effect of sector programmes goes in the face of the existing decentralisation programmes in many countries. Kasumba and Land (2003) describes a situation in Uganda where local elected councillors, rather than being encouraged to take ownership of the local development process, remain spectators to a centralised planning and budget allocation process. Similar situations have occurred in Tanzania, Mozambique and Vietnam, where the introduction of macro programmes led to formulation of a strategic sector-wide approach, allocation of strategic budgets to each sector, and monitoring of budgets centrally. At the same time the countries are claiming be in the process of moving from central planning towards more participatory decentralised approaches, in which the role of local actors, such as local governments, communities and private sector are enhanced.
In all three case study countries, sub-national administrations have -based on our observations while working with these countries -very little incentives and motivation to implement forest sector reforms and this will obstruct the implementation of NFPs and SWAps. The reforms recognise a need to improve salaries in order to improve accountability of civil servants, and motivate them to disseminate information and improve the service provision in local rural communities. The interviews with government authorities and donor representatives recognise that governments are not able to improve salaries if they do not reduce the number of civil servants. This is a very difficult situation for the sector ministry implementing the reforms, they should dismiss their fellow foresters in order to improve salaries, or should shift the group of foresters from central and regional positions to working with districts and rural communities. This reform dilemma defines what is peculiar about the present implementation of SWAps in forestry: the SWAp should be implemented at the same time with decentralisation in the forestry sector, which makes it a very political issue. A group of people, who will lose their high positions and power, resist these changes.
In Tanzania, Mozambique and Vietnam, working through the governmental organisations and structures does not always ensure the best possible outcome because many basic concepts of grassroots democracy, as defined in many Western societies, such as good governance, participation and civil society development, are still sensitive issues and need time to be stabilized. The majority of the population is likely to remain uninformed about the reforms and policy decisions related to forestry, and are unable to express opinions or exercise influence on development. Based on observations in all three case study countries, skilful and effective information dissemination and local decision making and ownership are still rare in the forestry sector (White and Mustalahti 2005 . Mustalahti 2006 , Mustalahti et al. 2006 . Foster et al. (2002) argues that governments also tend to be unable to influence development, and are relatively small players in the productive sectors, where market-based actors are dominant. The market-based actors' involvement in SWAps is recognised to be important in all three case countries, but difficult to implement: although the private sector is mentioned as one of the stakeholder groups, there have not been concrete ways to promote ownership and interest of private sector in forestry sector development. In Vietnam, the central ministry has difficulties to carry out effective forest law enforcement because strong decisionmaking powers rest at provincial level and are driven by market forces (McElwee 2004) . Sub-national authorities and party members at the provincial level may have more power than the central ministries, and decision-makers under the party cells might not always agree with the roles and regulations in forestry. In Mozambique, Mackenzie (2005) argues that high political leaders are involved in forest exploitation and the central ministry in Mozambique reclassifies timbers in order to permit export of illegal logs. Simula (2006) recognises that the implementation of the NFP has been difficult because of weak law enforcement and forest governance capacity in Tanzania. In all case study countries, it seems that the aims of NFPs and SWAps to facilitate the sustainable forest management and implementation of forest laws are conflicting with hidden agendas for utilisation of forest resources. In practice, this means that the national governments and their political leaders are unable or reluctant to stop illegal logging driven by the strong demand for logs from China's booming economy, and growing demand in Japan, USA and Europe for low-cost wood products manufactured in China (McElwee 2004 , Mackenzie 2005 , White et al. 2006 , Milledge et al 2007 .
In all three cases, moving towards SWAps and DBS, the responsibility of making decisions regarding allocated funds and implemented activities are expected to be led and administered by the recipient country. During the study it was recognised that national ownership in the forestry sector implies some loss of control by donors. This new relationship between donor and partner does not necessarily mean a 'close the eyes' situation: the donor agencies are -and should be in our opinion -still interested in follow-up, not only on the macro level but also at the micro level, as well as continuing to facilitate sustainable development by providing technical assistance and capacity building when needed.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
What was observed from the cases with regard to whether the sector-wide approach promotes effective delivery of aid? The SWAps in all three countries have an intention to develop an effective financial management in the sector. In the short term, however, the transaction costs rise, due to the need to set up new systems and agreements between different partners in the sectors. SWAps may not be the most effective way to deliver aid because the development of SWAp is a lengthy process, and highly dependent on the quality of institutional capacity in the recipient and the donor institutions. SWAps and DBS may take several years to begin producing concrete results in rural development and poverty reduction. In general, the SWAps in forestry might be less successful because dominance of market forces and hidden interests in under-reporting revenue collection at sub-national and national level.
On the other hand, the process of shifting from fragmented donor support for projects towards SWAps and DBS, and mobilisation of domestic revenue from the forestry sector, needs time and is related to other reforms and policy changes. These processes are expected to influence development in general, and the process to develop SWAps is a long-term commitment of learning together with different partners. SWAps and DBS improves national ownership in the forestry sector if there exists: (a) clear sector policies and development strategies, (b) long-term commitment by government and donors to support the forestry sector, (d) willingness to harmonise donor support, and (c) a cooperative private sector and NGOs.
However, in all likelihood, projects will remain important instruments for implementing sector strategies and national development frameworks: the complexity of the forestry sector and rural development in general needs many forms of support. Support to central governments to establish SWAps and DBS as aid modalities should not divert funding from the ultimate intended beneficiaries, nor from the intended objectives of the development cooperation. It is important to acknowledge that currently the main objective of development aid is poverty reduction. Although the importance of supporting policy development and building central government structures should not be underestimated, the significant question is how much support for macro level development and administrative structures is needed before the implementation of the SWAps and DBS yield results for the poor.
It should also be recognised that the establishment of a SWAp and the central government ownership in the SWAp process does not necessarily correspond to the needs and ownership at the sub-national level, where the forestry development needs to be implemented. Commercial forestry businesses, local communities and sub-national forest officials may have widely divergent interests, and success at the local level depends on good consultation and commitments from all.
The case studies indicate that NFPs and SWAps are complicated political, as well as technical, processes, and because of that, the representatives of the donor community and embassy advisers need to have technical skills and good analytical capacity to understand the political and socio-economic development nuances in the host country. To be able to participate in SWAps and DBS effectively, donor countries should employ embassy staff and advisers with field-level and practical experience, including an understanding of the difficulties and opportunities of field work. Based on our experiences from donor meetings, it is highly questionable if it is possible to establish meaningful relationships between donors and recipient governments with information obtained during macro level meetings. Adequate information from the micro level is needed in order to understand the impacts of aid in forestry and in rural development in general. Otherwise discussions at the central level can become removed from reality, and from what is possible or even desirable at local level. While planning and implementation processes may seem to have been successfully facilitated in a partnership meeting between donors and central government representatives, the reality at sub-national level may be different. Thus, continuing support for local level projects alongside support to sectoral or budget support processes is valuable and provides inputs and lessons learned to the higher level discussions.
